Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA
Dissertation "Three Essays on the Informational Aspects of Untrustworthy Experts, Elusive Agents and Corrupt Supervisors''
B.A. in Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant private information (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses game theory to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research is published in several academic journals, including Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior. During his doctoral studies, Gorkem has been named the inaugural recipient of the Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship for his distinguished performance in teaching and research.
Research Statement (August 2008)
Primary: Contract theory, Economics of Information
Secondary: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Positive Political Theory, Law and Economics
Articles"Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism" (G. Celik, M. Peters), Games and Economic Behavior, Nov 2011, Vol. 73, Issue 2, p. 375‑387
"Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation " (G. Celik, O. Yilankaya), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances) , Jul 2009, Vol. 9, Issue 1
"Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision" (G. Celik), Journal of Economic Theory, Jan 2009, Vol. 144, Issue 1, p. 69‑95
"On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers" (G. Celik, S. Sayan), Review of Economic Design, Sep 2008, Vol. 12, Issue 3, p. 209‑227
"Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties" (G. Celik), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), Feb 2008, Vol. 8, Issue 1
"Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints" (G. Celik), Games and Economic Behavior, Jul 2006, Vol. 56, Issue 1, p. 37‑44
Working papers"RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MECHANISM DESIGN" (with M. Peters). The University of British Columbia, Aug 11. ( Link to the latest version: http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/reciprocal_mechanisms.pdf)
"Optimal auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation" (with O. Yilankaya). UBC Department of Economics, Jan 05.
"Interested Experts: Do They Know More?" The University of British Columbia, Mar 03. (link: http://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/home/pdf/int03.pdf)
Other Teaching Activities
2002 - 2009 - Assistant Professor, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Oct 2006-Aug 2007 - Visiting Assistant Professor, Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey
Awards and Distinctions
2011 – 2013: Researcher for “Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism,” Marie Curie Reintegration Grant, European Commission, €50,000.
2006 – 2009: Principal investigator for “Participation in Mechanisms when the alternative is a Default Game,” joint project with Michael Peters. Funded by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. SSHRC Standard Research Grant, 26,500 CAD.
2000-2001: Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University (awarded annually to a graduate student who has distinguished himself in both teaching and research)
1998: Distinction in the Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics and Econometrics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
1997-1998: University Fellowship, Northwestern University
Affiliations and Academic Responsibilities
Research Fellow with THEMA (CNRS and University Cergy-Pontoise)
Member of the THEMA Conseil du Laboratoire
Member of the LABEX MME-DII Scientific Committee